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- ---- VISIONS 
am primarily an histo 
stretched in quite different ways. Although much of what I to non- 
often intrinsically difficult for them to grasp, moa of .what I bring 
intrinsically hfficult for them but requires them to resist the temp 
legal history mainly in terms of legal doctrinal and institutional Wtters: Indeeqi, one a€ & ' 
questions current historians of law commonly ask is, why have lkgd e lks  typically ,, 
conceived of the history of law from "inside" the law? If law students can getsufficiently 
outside of the law to understand all that the question implies, they are well on the way 
My main scholarly interest is the lustory of criminal justice in.England and h e f i c a  
from medieval times to the present. The particular themes that dominate in yy sc$obhip 
tend to appear with some (my students would say obsessive) frequency ,in'my teaching. 
They are certainly among the issues that my "multidisciplinary expertise" has led (and 
perhaps even "helped) me to examine. Specificallp I have long been interested id two , , 
ideas regarding human freedom: political liberty and free will. Of the two, free will 9, 
been my main concern; my interest in it has often centered on its relationship to ideas and 
practices associated with political liberty To give an illustratioi: one aspect of my long? i 
standing interest in the lustory of the criminal trial jury involves the community-based 1 
attitudes that, via the j u q  have sometimes served either to constrain or to expand state 
power over individuals. Among those attitudes has been, at thnes, the belief (qr intuition) 
that particular offenders did not possess the freedom - here, ,mning p i r s ~ i d  agency - 1 
that the formal law assumed (or was taken to assume) was required for criminal convic 
(or a certain level of punishment). At other times, formal legal rules 'that defined the 
absence - or relative absence - of freedom, and, hence of mens yea, have seemed too 
broad and have resulted in successful appeals to jurors to interpret the law narrowly an 
thus to perform their "duty" of making those "truly responsible" for harm pay for their 
wrongdoing. These divergent social perspectives regardin& criminal responsibility 
existed in local communities and have been given &cf on an ad hoc basis, a proc 
has resulted in institutional and doctrinal developmdt of differing kinds - so 
reflecting resistance to the influence of "non-legal" ideas, some reflecting acqui 
or actual acceptance of those ideas. Yet another closely related example: one of 
interests in Anglo-American legal thought centers precisely on the role of ideas abo 
freedom in the history of attempts to justify, criticize, or simply to explain the use of 
trial. I have often employed analysis of that subject as lead-in to consideration of thin 
past and present, of jurists and non-jurists, about many other legal doctrinal an 
institutional problems regarding the relationship between human free will and 
political liberty. 
As an historian, I am more concerned with the history and present status of th 
phenomena I have briefly encapsulated than with matters of "policy." I am not especi 
confident that an historical perspective suggests how best to resolve present legal problems 
regarding free will either to make the law more coherent or to reform it in order to make 
life in an organized society more coherent, satisfymg, fair, or in any other way just. Not 
that 1 regard those ends as unworthy; rather, my interest in the free will problem is related 
to my belief that it defies resolution. The history of doctrinal, institutional, social, and 
academic practice and debate regarding the free will issue - especially in relation to 
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political liberty - is always enlightening. It is is also-@, 
amusing, depressing, orBagic dependmg on oneb mood of the 
moment. It is, for better or worse, a part of history a d  in my 
view, a large part. 
Thus, my study and teaching of history bear importaatly on 
my study and teaching of law, for many and fairly obvious 
reasons. For many years I taught Property and, not su'prisindy 
1 often focused on the idea of individual initiative (or "labof) 
that, in part, underlies (justifies) the idea of entitlement. This 
commonly accepted justification often rests, at least implicitly, 
on the notion of human free d l .  Though the same result can 
be reached on a purely utilitarian analysis, and that analysis is 
sometimes invoked, the actual application of doctrine has 
mainly been guided by slowly-evolving freedom-kd ideas that 
are integral to our social and political culture and our group and 
personal psychology. When, in teachmg a particular aspect of 
property law, I moved from doctrinal analysis, per se, to 
discussion of historical context, I tended to focus on one or 
another s d  of the history of social or political thought since 
the late 17th century. 1 sought in doing so to demonstrate the 
degree to which the law is, in one of its guises, an aspect of 
intellectual history, and to trace briefly g e  evolution of those 
ideas and interests that have served to contain the deterministic 
side of modem thought and have underwritten lads claim - 
through emphasis on human free will - to relative separation 
h m  sheer historical contingency. I should add (or confess) 
that, although 1 was origurally trained as a medievalist, I spent 
relatively little time in class on the origins and early 
development of estates and future interests; no doubt my 
students suffered from too little focus on the relationship 
between ideas about free will and the doctrine of springing uses. 
But one can't do everything. 
You might be wondering - if you are still reading this - 
why I hught Property rather than Criminal Law, since the latter 
corresponds directly to my field of research and writing. I have 
hitherto avoided teaching Criminal Law precisely for the reason 
I write about its history, that is, because it raises (for me at 
least) the free will issue in an especially fundamental and 
compekng, but totally perplexing way I have no solution to the 
deepest problems that stmng doubts about the reality of human 
free will pose for criminal law, in theory or in practice, and little 
taste for replicating the linguistic and philosophical gymnastics 
of the many criminal law scholars who have struggled in good 
faith both to face the issue and yet avoid the conclusion that the 
law (and life) is very possibly meaningless. At current rates, 
such a conclusion might well seem unsatisfymg to many 
students. As it happens, I shall begin teaching Criminal Law 
next term. I am not sure what determined me to make that 
twilight-of-career choice (not the dean, by the way) or exactly 
how 1 am going to approach the course. If you are curious about 
how it went, feel "free" to write me next summer. 
